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Abstract
This paper explores the effects of disability insurance (DI) benefits on the labor market de-
cision of existing DI beneficiaries using data from the Swiss Household Panel. We use a fuzzy
regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the effect of DI benefits on the decision of working
full-time, part-time or staying out of the labor force by exploiting a discontinuity in the DI benefit
award rate. Overall, our results suggest that the Swiss DI system creates substantial lock-in effects
which heavily influence the working decision of existing beneficiaries: the benefit receipt increases
the probability of working part-time by about 41%-points, decreases the probability of working
full-time by about 42%-points but has little or no effects on the probability of staying out of the
labor force for the average beneficiary. Therefore, DI benefits induce a shift in the labor supply
decision of existing beneficiaries in the sense that they reduce their work intensity from working
full-time to part-time adding a possible explanation for the low DI outflow across the OECD.
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1 Introduction
In most industrialized countries the costs of disability insurance (DI) programs are substantial in size
and therefore place a serious fiscal burden on countries finances. Many workers leave the labor market
permanently due to health issues driving both the inflow and stock of DI beneficiaries. In fact, the
number of DI benefit recipients as a share of the working age population (the disability recipiency
rate) has risen rapidly over the past few decades across the OECD: from 1970 to 2013 the average
annual growth rate in disability recipiency was at a level of 3.10% in the United States; 2.08% in
Great Britain; 2.98% in Australia and 2.69% in Sweden (Burkhauser et al., 2013). Growth can also
be seen in Switzerland where the number of beneficiaries has risen from 199’000 in 2000 to 230’000
in 2013 (average annual growth rate of 1.1%). Of course, these growing trends in DI beneficiaries
are also reflected in the national DI expenditure levels. For instance, the DI cash transfer payments
totaled in the United States $25 billion in 1990, rising to a level of $140 billion in 2013 (Social
Security Administration, 2015). Likewise, the expenditure figures in Switzerland show a similar but
less dramatic pattern, jumping from 4.1 billion Swiss Francs in 1990 to 9.3 billion Swiss Francs in
2013 (Federal Social Insurance Office, 2015).
As a response to the unsustainable growth in program costs and the exploding number of ben-
eficiaries, policy makers have introduced various reforms addressing the incentive structure of the
DI system. However, recent DI policy has been almost exclusively focused on reducing the inflow
of new DI beneficiaries by offering employment creating measures such as job placement and career
advice for people applying for DI benefits. At the same time, most OECD countries have tightened
the access to benefits and reduced compensation generosity over the past two decades. Despite these
efforts, very little has been done to address the stock of existing beneficiaries, which is surprising
given the fact that the DI outflow for reasons other than death is as low as 1% across the OECD
(OECD, 2010). What this low outflow suggests is that most DI programs create substantial lock-in
effects given that beneficiaries rarely leave the system, even though some of them might have remain-
ing work-capacities. Economic theory suggests here a classical moral hazard issue: individuals who
receive high disutility from working remain out of the labor force permanently since the DI system
redistributes resources to them (Bound & Burkhauser (1999), Shu (2015)). The negative effects of
the DI benefits on labor market participation is also well-documented in the empirical literature (e.g.
Bound (1989), Chen & van der Klaauw (2008), Marie & Castello (2012), French & Song (2014),
Moore (2015), Frutos & Castello (2015)), although evidence for the Switzerland is scarce (e.g. Kauer
(2014), Eugster & Deuchert (2015)).
In light of the above, it is important to learn more about the mechanisms and determinants
contributing to the low DI outflow. In this paper, we analyze how existing beneficiaries adapt their
labor supply decision as a response to the financial incentives embodied in the Swiss DI system.
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From an econometrician’s point of view, an important issue when estimating working decisions is
to address the endogeneity of the DI benefit status. Endogeneity is a problem in this context because
participation in DI programs is the outcome of an individual decision to apply for the benefits.
Furthermore, benefit applicants have to undergo an eligibility determination process that is based
on a list of predefined medical and vocational criteria. As a consequence, comparing the working
decision of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries will be confounded by the differences in observable
and unobservable characteristics which exist between the groups. In this paper, we address the
endogeneity issue in the DI benefit status by using a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design
exploiting a discontinuity in the benefit award rate. The discontinuity in the benefit award rate arises
due to the common practice of DI offices using the age of an applicant as a key factor when deciding
the DI benefits (Federal Social Insurance Office, 2013). Individuals above the age of 55 are much more
likely to receive DI benefits than people below that age. Given that applicants cannot manipulate
their age, the discontinuity in the benefit award rate qualifies as a valid exogenous instrument for
the DI benefits. We estimate the benefit effects on the labor supply decision of working part-time,
full-time or staying out of the labor force using discrete endogenous switching (ES) models (Miranda
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2006; Roodman, 2011). A special feature of discrete ES models is, under the
assumption of jointly normal errors, that they allow one to estimate unconditional average treatment
effects (ATE), as well as average treatment effects on the treated (ATT). In sharp contrast to that,
2SLS and therefore the classical fuzzy RD design only produce local average effects (Angrist &
Pischke, 2009).
One practical issue with discrete ES models is that they result in rather complicated likelihood
functions which have to be maximized using maximum simulated likelihood1 (MSL). The fact that
these methods are not part of the toolkit of standard econometrics and the corresponding estimators
are usually not implemented in statistical software packages might explain why this type of model is
rarely used in applied econometrics. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to look at
the effects of DI benefits on labor supply through the lense of discrete ES models.
Another contribution of this paper is to analyze the discrete labor market participation decision
of working part-time, full-time or staying out of the labor force instead of focusing on the binary
decision of working versus not working. The existing literature entirely focuses on the latter (e.g.
Gruber (2000), Chen & van der Klaauw (2008), Marie & Castello (2012), French & Song (2014),
Moore (2015)) neglecting the fact that a substantial fraction of the working population is part-
time employed, which is especially true in the population of people with a disability (OECD, 2010).
Therefore, modeling the more complex discrete working decision has the potential to reveal interesting
new facets of the incentive effects embodied in DI benefits.
1The focus will be on the Geweke, Hajivassiliou and Keane (GHK) algorithm that allows estimating higher-order
dimensional cumulative normal distributions (Roodman, 2011).
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Overall, the results of this analysis show that the financial incentives in the Swiss DI system
create substantial lock-in effects that heavily influence the working decision of existing beneficiaries.
In fact, the discrete ES model shows an interesting new aspect which could not be captured when
focusing on simple binary working decisions: the individual benefit receipt significantly increases
the probability of working in a part-time job (ATT: 41%-points), reduces the probability of working
full-time (ATT: –42%-points) but has little or no effect on the probability of staying out of the labor
force (ATT: 3%-points). This allows for the interpretation that the incentives inherent in DI benefits
do not force the beneficiaries out of the labor force but instead induces a shift in their labor supply
decision from working full-time to part-time.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section 2, we give an overview on the different
identification strategies that have been used in the literature. Then, we discuss the structure of the
Swiss DI system and give information on the eligibility determination process which is relevant for
the identification strategy used in this paper. Section 4 describes the data set and variables that are
used for the analysis and sheds light on the population of beneficiaries. The identification strategy,
validity checks, the discrete ES model and estimation procedure is then outlined in Section 5. Section
6 provides an in-depth overview of the main results and robustness checks. Final conclusions are
drawn in Section 7.
2 Literature Review
Different identification strategies have been used in the past to model the behavioral response to
DI programs. Most of the earlier empirical studies ignored the endogeneity issue as outlined above
and concentrated on estimating labor force participation (LFP) equations using standard regression
techniques.
Parsons (1980a, 1980b) uses cross-sectional data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Older
Men to estimate the non-labor-force-participation as a function of the SSDI2 replacement rate and
demographic and health characteristics such as age, gender, education and health status. He obtains
an elasticity of labor force non-participation with respect to benefit levels3 for prime-aged men (age
45-59) of between 0.49 (1980a) and 0.93 (1980b) using a classical logit specification to estimate his
LFP equations. One major drawback of the two studies is that the replacement rate, i.e., the Social
2The social security disability insurance (SSDI) program is one of the two main federal programs to provide cash
assistance to the disabled in the US. The other program is the supplemental security income (SSI) program that was
introduced in 1972 to provide a minimum level of income to impaired individuals (Social Security Administration,
2014).
3The elasticity of non-participation with respect to benefits is defined as the ratio of the change in the labor supply
relative to the change in potential benefits (Gruber, 2000).
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Security benefits relative to the market wage is based on imputed wage histories which determine an
individual’s Social Security benefit level in the US.
Slade (1984) reproduces Parsons’ (1980a, 1980b) findings but uses instead data from the Retire-
ment History Survey (RHS) in which individual responses were matched to actual Social Security
earnings records. He estimates an elasticity of non-participation of 0.81, implying a drop in the labor
market participation of 0.81% for every 1% increase in the SSDI replacement rate.
These early studies encounter at least three econometric problems: (i) Endogeneity in the DI
receipt is not addressed which leads to inconsistent and biased coefficient estimates on the replacement
rate variable (Bound, 1989); (ii) By grouping the disability pension and wages into one single measure
(the replacement rate), the separate impact of each is confounded by the other; (iii) In the US,
the actual amount of disability benefits depends on a person’s earnings history, thus generating a
correlation between the level of benefits and past earnings, leading to additional omitted variable
bias on the replacement rate (Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008).
One of the earliest attempts to deal with the endogeneity issue can be found in the study by
Haveman and Wolfe (1984) who use a two stage least-squares approach. They calculate elasticities of
participation with respect to expected invalidity benefits of between -0.0003 and -0.0005. In addition,
they report predicted LFP rates at the mean of all explanatory variables, that suggest that a 20%
increase in benefits decreases participation from 91.37% to 90.73%. While the studies by Parsons
(1980a, 1980b) and Slade (1984) suggest a virtually one-for-one drop in participation rates, the IV
estimates of Haveman and Wolfe (1984) suggest not much of an impact at all. The major problem
with the latter study is that the authors fail to provide a convincing justification for their exclusion
restrictions required in order to generate plausible instruments (Bound, 1989).
Other studies propose a fairly different and yet simpler approach to capture the effects of dis-
ability insurance benefits on LFP by comparing participation rates of disability payment recipients
to appropriate comparison groups. Gastwirth (1972) uses the 1966 Survey of the Disabled to obtain
an estimate of how many of those on SSDI might work if they were not receiving benefits. For that
purpose, he compares the beneficiaries to the group of men with work impairments who received no
income transfers. His empirical work suggests that about 87% of men in the latter group were in the
labor force which he argues to be an upper bound for the proportion of recipients who would work
in the absence of SSDI.
However, Swisher (1973) argues that the findings by Gastwirth (1972) clearly exaggerate the
potential work disincentive effects of SSDI. She emphasizes the fact that in the 1966 Survey of the
Disabled, only 27.3% of the men who reported to be disabled were severely disabled, 28.5% were
occupationally disabled and the remaining 44.2% reported secondary work limitations. At the same
time, the vast majority of men on SSDI claim to be severely disabled. From that she concludes that
Gastwirth (1972) should have only included the severely disabled men who were not on the payroll
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as a credible control group for the SSDI recipients. Her findings show that only 44% of the control
group participated in the labor market and only a small fraction of them worked full-time the whole
year (10.4%) (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999).
To summarize the magnitude of the potential work disincentives of the SSDI program crucially
depends on the selected comparison group. If the comparison group contains all men who are to
a certain extent impaired but do not receive any income transfer, then we would conclude that DI
benefits heavily influence the individual labor force and work decision. On the other hand, if the
relevant comparison group only includes the severely disabled who are not receiving benefits, the
labor supply effects seem to be much less pronounced.
One of the most influential papers to this day is the study by Bound (1989) on ”The Health and
Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants”. Bound suggests that SSDI applicants who
fail to pass the medical screening necessary to qualify for the program form a natural control group
for the beneficiaries. As a rationale, he argues that the rejected SSDI applicants and beneficiaries
should be quite similar with respect to observed and unobserved characteristics, thus making them
comparable in their LFP decision. Using data from the 1972 Survey of Disabled and Non-Disabled
Adults (SDNA) and the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work (SDW), his analysis shows that less than
one-third of the rejected applicants were working at the time of the survey and less than 50% worked
at some point the previous year. In addition, he finds that the earnings of those who do return
to work are roughly 30% below pre-disability levels and more than 50% below their ablebodied
counterparts. Bound argues that the rejected applicants are healthier and more capable of work
than those who receive an income transfer. Therefore, their LFP rate forms an upper bound for the
work participation behavior of the beneficiaries in the absence of the invalidity payments.
More recent studies use natural experiments to shed light on the labor force participation effects
of DI benefits. For example, Gruber (2000) exploits a huge policy change in the Canadian DI system
in the late 1980s. DI in Canada operates basically the same way as it does in the US but with the key
difference that there are two distinct DI programs: the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), which covers
only the region of Quebec and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), which covers the remaining regions
of Canada. Until 1986, the QPP was substantially more generous in terms of benefits than the CPP.
Then, in 1987, the CPP raised its benefits by 36% to the level of the QPP to equalize the generosity
levels of the two systems. Gruber uses this exogenous policy change in disability benefits to estimate
its labor supply effects using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. The comparison in the
change in the labor force participation of prime-aged men in Quebec to those in the rest of Canada
over the period from 1985 to 1989 implies an elasticity of non-participation with respect to benefit
levels of between 0.28 and 0.36. He concludes that the policy change and therefore the increase in
benefit levels did not simply distort labor supply decisions but also induced positive welfare effects
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for those now qualified for the more generous disability transfers since replacement rates in Canada
were historically much lower than in the US.
Campolieti (2004) follows the path by Gruber to examine a $50 increase in monthly disability
benefits on labor supply for the QPP program in 1973, which did not occur in the CPP program.
She uses the same empirical strategy as Gruber, but unlike Gruber her estimates mostly suggest that
disability benefits are not associated with higher non-participation rates of older men. Campolieti
argues that the differences in estimates to Gruber (2000) can be mostly explained by the changes in
the screening stringency regimes between the 1970s and 1980s.
Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) use a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) approach to exploit
a special feature of the eligibility determination process in the US DI program: both the SSDI and
SSI program base their disability determination decision for some individuals not solely on medical
grounds but also on vocational factors (age, education and work experience) as well. They use the
fact that the award rate (the probability of receiving benefits) is a function of the age of an applicant
which is discontinuous at known age levels. The rationale is that individuals just below the cutoff age
can be expected to be fairly similar to individuals just above the cutoff age in terms of observed and
unobserved characteristics. Therefore, comparing the two groups around the cutoff age with respect
to their LFP reveals the causal effect of the DI benefit receipt. Overall, they find relatively small
distorting effects: the LFP rate of beneficiaries would have been at most 20%-points higher had they
not received benefits.
Another strand of the literature examines the effects of stricter screening of applicants and tighter
eligibility rules on LFP. The idea here is that policy changes affecting either screening stringency
or eligibility rules that apply only for a subset of the population can be used to quantify potential
participation effects of DI benefits for that group. The study by Staubli (2011) analyzes the impact
of a tightening in disability eligibility rules on the labor supply of older workers in Austria. He uses
the policy change introduced by the Structural Adjustment Act in 1996 which most importantly
lead to stricter disability eligibility criteria for men at the age of 55 to 57 to examine (i) how tighter
criteria for benefits affect enrollment and employment and (ii) whether a tightening in eligibility rules
leads to spillover effects into other programs. Relying on a DID approach, he finds that the share of
beneficiaries in the affected age group significantly decreased by 6 to 7.2%-points after the reform was
implemented. In addition, his estimates indicate an increase in employment by 1.7 to 3.4%-points
after the policy change. At the same time, his results suggest a raise in the share of individuals
receiving unemployment or sickness insurance benefits indicating substantial spillover effects.
Similarly, Karlstro¨m et al. (2008) exploit a policy change that tightened eligibility rules for older
workers in Sweden. Unlike Staubli (2011), they find only small declines in the DI enrollment and no
effects on employment. The main reason for such differences can be found in the difference of the
marginal applicant in Sweden versus Austria. Studies concerning the effects of screening stringency
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on LFP have been done for the case of the US by Gruber and Kubik (1997) and Autor and Duggan
(2003). The US studies are conclusive since they both find that stricter screening leads to significant
increases in labor supply among older males.
Finally, the study by De Jong et al. (2010) is a rare and therefore special example of an empirical
study in the field of economics where they use a field-experiment to investigate the effects of intensified
screening of DI benefit applications on the working decision in the Netherlands. The experiment was
designed such that in two of the 26 Dutch regions, case workers of the National Social Insurance
Institute (NSII) were instructed to screen DI benefit applications more intensely. They find that
intensified screening leads to a significant decrease in both 13 weeks sickness absence reports and
DI applications. Moreover, their experiment does not show any spillover effects to the inflow into
unemployment insurance. Using a crude cost-benefit analysis, they conclude that the benefits of the
intensified screening clearly exceed its costs.
3 Institutional Background
The Swiss DI is a nationwide, compulsory social insurance that provides rehabilitation measures and
cash benefits for Swiss citizens who are disabled. As the social security disability insurance (SSDI)
program in the United States, it is mainly financed by social insurance contributions of the working
population and public funding. In 2012, the Swiss DI accounts for about 6.5% of the total social
security expenditures in Switzerland and is therefore the fourth biggest branch in the Swiss social
security system, after sickness insurance (16.5%), old-age insurance (27.2%) and occupational pension
plans (33.3%) (FSIO, 2014). Swiss citizens are eligible for benefits if there is a causal connection
between the impairment to health4 and the corresponding earnings loss. Furthermore, residence of
Switzerland are only entitled to DI payments if the working incapacity has lasted for at least a year
and is likely to persist and the rehabilitation option has been entirely exhausted.
To this day, the DI remains a prominent topic in the political discourse which can be seen by
the periodical reforms to the system: the 4th revision of the Swiss DI Act (2004) most importantly
introduced regional medical screening institutions, abolished additional pensions for spouses and
introduced the three-quarter pension. The more recent reforms are mostly focused on employment
and reintegration measures: starting with the 5th revision in 2008, the leading principle of the
Swiss DI was changed to ”rehabilitation before a pension”, which broadly extended the range of
possibilities to offer disabled individuals the proper incentives and support to stay in the labor market
instead of depending entirely on DI benefits. Rehabilitation measures include medical measures to
treat congenital disabilities, supply of appliances (wheel chairs, hearing aid devices, implants, etc.),
4Any physical or psychological health impairment, irrespective whether it is congenital, illness-related or accident-
related entitles claimants to DI benefits (FSIO, 2014).
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occupational measures (career advice, re-training, vocational training, job placement, capital grants,
etc.) and daily cash benefits as ancillary benefits (FSIO, 2013). However, the 5th revision was
primarily focused on measures to reduce the inflow of DI beneficiaries. Measures to reduce the stock
of existing beneficiaries were only introduced with the most recent DI revision in 2012 (revision
6a). The DI outflow is aimed to be increased by reassessing and possibly terminating existing cases
with pathogenesis-etiologically unclear syndromes such as somatoform pain disorders, whiplash and
hypersomnia among others (FSIO, 2015).
Even though the Swiss DI emphasizes the importance of reintegration measures, examining the DI
statistics presents a slightly different picture: the 2013 statistics show that of the total expenditures
of approximately 9.3 billion CHF, only 23% were spent on rehabilitation measures. The lion’s share
or 60.1% were used on DI pensions or helplessness allowances. A significant difference between the
Swiss system and the SSDI program lies in the method to calculate the amount of the DI benefits: in
Switzerland, the degree of disability determines the type of pension a claimant receives. The degree
of disability is defined as the percentage of the loss of earnings due to disability (”Erwerbseinbusse”)
to the potential earnings of a claimant in the absence of the impairment (”Valideneinkommen”).
Table (1) gives an overview of the types of pensions and minimum and maximum amounts that are
associated with different degrees of disability. For example, claimants with a degree of disability less
than 40% are not entitled to any pension at all, whereas claimants with a degree of disability higher
than 70% are entitled to a full pension. Overall, the Swiss DI system is very generous in terms of
benefits, ranking on a top spot alongside the Scandinavian countries. In comparison to that, many
Anglo-Saxon countries are found on the other end of the compensation rank (OECD, 2009).
In 2013, a total of 402’000 Swiss residence received DI services including rehabilitation measures,
benefits or helplessness allowances. Out of the 402’000 individuals, 230’000 received cash benefits
and another 192’000 participated in reintegration measures. It is Important to know that about 75%
of the pensions were full pensions. In our data, the share of beneficiaries receiving a full pension is
at 72%. Furthermore, as in most Western societies, the probability of receiving disability pensions
drastically increases for the group of prime-aged men and women in Switzerland. In numbers, about
60% of all recipients are aged between 40-64 and overall, about 16% (13%) of men (women) aged
60-65 are recipients of DI benefits. From an economic point of view, these numbers raise the question
whether DI is used as means of early retirement or if it simply reflects the fact that the occurrence of
illnesses increases as a part of the process of aging. At the same time, only 15% of recipients can be
found among individuals aged 20-39. This age category primarily uses of job re-integration measures
offered by local DI offices. Finally, the insured in the age group below 20 years account for about
25% of all recipients. In this age segment, congenital disorders are the main cause for the benefit
receipt (FSIO, 2014).
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3.1 Eligibility Determination Process
A person seeking benefits applies at the cantonal DI office. In a first step, the applicant submits
the medical documentation of his condition, as well as his previous earnings records. Caseworkers
at the local DI office in collaboration with an interdisciplinary team of medical doctors, specialists
and vocational consultants then decide whether a person qualifies for benefits. Whether or not an
applicant is eligible for benefits is based on a predefined set of medical and vocational factors such
as education and age to assess a persons’ capability to work. Before the 4th revision of the Swiss DI
in 2004, the health assessment of the applicant was entirely based on the medical certificates issued
by the applicant’s chosen doctor. To standardize and improve the quality of screening, the reform
in 2004 introduced several supra-regional medical audit institutions that are authorized to conduct
appraisals of benefit claims and to carry out medical examinations. In addition to the medical
assessment, a team of vocational consultants evaluates the personal and vocational situation of the
applicant. The team has to check for possible reintegration and rehabilitation measures reflecting
the guiding principle ”rehabilitation before a pension”. After all the relevant information is gathered,
the caseworkers have to decide on each case within 12 months. If the decision is not accepted by the
applicant, appeals can be submitted to the cantonal insurance court within 30 days. Further levels
of appeal are conducted in Federal Supreme Courts (FSIO, 2013).
4 Data
We use data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) for the year 2012. The SHP is especially
suitable to analyze the financial incentives inherent in DI benefits on the working decision of existing
beneficiaries because it offers two desirable features: first, it provides data on a stock of actual DI
beneficiaries. Figure (1) gives an overview of the dynamics of the shares of DI beneficiaries in the
whole sample as well as in different age groups since the year 2002. Overall, the share of beneficiaries
is fairly stable at around 3.5% on average. However, figure (1) shows that there exist remarkable
differences in the pool of recipients between age groups. The data set resembles what we observe
in most OECD countries: prime-aged men and women are clearly over-represented amongst the
beneficiaries. On average about 7.1% of individuals between the age of 55 and 65 collect DI pensions.
In the subpopulation of individuals aged 20-54 on the other hand, only about 2.5% are entitled to
benefits.
Second, the SHP contains rich information on numerous background characteristics which allow
to isolate the effect of DI benefits on the labor supply decision of beneficiaries. The data set includes
information on demographic, socio-economic and various health related indicators. The demographic
and socio-economic status variables include the age of the respondent at the time of the interview, an
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indicator for gender, dummies for region of residence5, indicators for type of community6, the weight
of a person in kilograms, the height of a person in centimeters, the number of kids living in the
household between the age of 0 and 17, an indicator for Non-Swiss citizens, marital status, logarith-
mized gross household income in Swiss Francs, years of schooling and an indicator for life satisfaction.
The health indicators that we focus on in our analysis are: the number of doctor consultations and
the number of ill-days in the past 12 months, a physical activity indicator, an indicator for health
impediments in everyday activities, an indicator for medication needed in everyday functioning, a
dummy for self-assessed well-being and indicator variables for depression, anxiety and blues, back
problems, weakness and weariness, sleeping problems and headaches7.
Throughout the entire analysis the sample is restricted to individuals between the age of 18 and
65, since there are no DI benefit recipients below and above these cutoff values. Moreover, the
data cleaning procedure excludes all observations without accurate information such as filter errors,
inapplicability, no answer or does not know. The final estimation sample contains 3’531 observations.
4.1 DI Beneficiaries vs. Non-Beneficiaries
Before turning to the identification strategy, it makes sense at this point to shed some light on the
endogeneity issue concerning the benefit status by characterizing the subpopulation of DI benefi-
ciaries. Table (2) reports the mean values and differences in means for a selection of variables for
the DI beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The comparison of demographic characteristics reveals
that the beneficiaries are on average significantly older, heavier in body weight, smaller in body size
and live in households with less children than the non-beneficiaries. The difference in demographic
characteristics brings home an important point: when comparing the working decision of recipients
and non-recipients, one has to keep in mind that these groups differ along many dimensions besides
their benefit status. In this context for example, we see that non-beneficiaries are much younger on
average. At the same time, we know that younger individuals are more likely to be employed since
they are usually more productive and typically earn less than their older counterparts. As a result,
the difference in working behavior not only reflects the benefit effects but also the age differences8.
Furthermore, the comparison of socio-economic characteristics suggests that the non-recipients are
more educated than the recipients, as they attend school for about one and a half additional years
on average. In addition to that, non-beneficiary households earn about 44’500 Swiss Francs more
a year and the proportion of individuals who report to be satisfied with their life exceeds that of
5Central Switzerland (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden and Zug) is used as the base category.
6Rural communes are chosen to be the base category.
7See Appendix A for a detailed description of the variable construction.
8Controlling for such age effects bears no econometric problem since the age of a respondent can be simply included
in the analysis as a confounder. The more serious issue arises since there are many unobservable factors that differ
between the two groups.
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the beneficiaries by about 26%-points. Next, the comparison of the health indicators shows sub-
stantial differences between the groups: the beneficiaries visit the doctor about 3 times as often as
the non-beneficiaries and the amount of ill-days is more than seven times as large as in the group
of the non-beneficiaries. Moreover, the DI benefit recipients are significantly less involved in sports
activities and the share of individuals reporting a ”very well” or ”well” health status is about 38%-
points lower for the beneficiaries. In addition to that, more than 70% of beneficiaries claim to have
health impediments that severely affect their everyday life and about 66% of them depend on med-
ication to complete everyday tasks. As for the medical conditions, depression, anxiety and blues,
back problems, weakness and weariness, sleeping problems and headaches, we find a significantly
higher prevalence of such diseases in the group of beneficiaries. Overall, the data on the health
indicators draws a consistent picture that suggests that the majority of those on DI benefits suffer
from substantial health limitations.
The bottom line from this mean-comparison is that the population of beneficiaries differs substan-
tially from the population of non-beneficiaries in many observable and unobservable9 factors. Any
attempt to compare the groups with respect to their working decision is therefore doomed to fail,
since we are not comparing apples and apples but rather apples and oranges. Revealing the isolated
effect of DI benefits therefore at least involves controlling for these observable characteristics.
5 Identification Strategy
The main purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of DI benefits on the labor market decision of
existing DI beneficiaries. We apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design exploiting a discon-
tinuous jump in the benefit award rate at the age of 56 as an instrument for the individual benefit
status. Specifically, we estimate the benefit effects on the individual decision to work part-time,
full-time or stay out of the labor force using discrete endogenous switching (ES) models (Miranda &
Rabe-Hesketh, 2006; Roodman, 2011).
5.1 Discontinuity in the Benefit Award Rate
The benefit award rate is the probability of receiving DI benefits in relation to a person’s age and is
depicted in figure (2). The dots represent the mean share of beneficiaries over bins of half-years of
age. The scatter plot is overlaid with a linear fit and a corresponding 95%-confidence interval. The
dashed red vertical line indicates the age of 56. The graph shows that for the individuals below the
age of 56, the benefit award rate is roughly stable at a level of about 4-5%. Above the age of 55,
the probability of receiving DI benefits is well above the 5%-mark indicating a discontinuous jump in
9Plausible candidates that are likely to differ between groups are factors such as risk preferences, genetic endowments,
innate abilities, etc.
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the benefit award rate at the age of 56. This means that individuals just below that age cutoff have
a significantly lower probability of receiving DI benefits than people just above the discontinuity.
The discontinuity is also confirmed when running classical first-stage regressions using the benefit
status as the dependent variable. Table (3) shows the first-stage effects for two different model
specifications. In both cases, the discontinuity is estimated to be approximately 4%-points which
coincides with the graphical evidence in figure (2). The Cragg-Donald Wald F -statistics are above
the usual critical values rejecting the null of a weak instrument and therefore indicating instrument
relevance (Stock & Yogo, 2005).
Why do we observe a discontinuity in benefit awards? As in most OECD countries10, the eligibility
determination process in Switzerland is explicitly based on both medical and vocational factors
including the social situation and the age of an applicant (FSIO, 2013). The fact that local DI offices
take into account such background characteristics when deciding the DI benefits leads to differences in
the likelihood of receiving DI benefits for different subgroups of applicants. For example, individuals
losing their job around the age of 55 have much bigger problems re-entering the job market than
younger individuals. This is particularly true for unskilled workers where job reintegration measures
are usually no valid option. In such cases, DI is often used as a substitute for early retirement which
in turn explains the sharp increase in the share of beneficiaries above the age of 5511.
5.2 RD Validity Checks
The key identifying assumption in any RD framework is based on the inability of individuals to
precisely control the assignment variable near the threshold. Since applicants cannot manipulate
their age, they have no control on whether they are to the left or the right of the cutoff at the age of
56 and thus those below form a natural control group for those above (”local randomization”). As a
consequence, observable as well as unobservable characteristics are balanced around the cutoff and
treatment is ”as good as randomized” (Lee & Lemieux, 2009).
To assess the validity of the RD design we check for discontinuities in the forcing variable and
baseline covariates. Both a discontinuity in the assignment variable and predetermined variables
would cast doubt on the validity of the RD design and thus our identification strategy. A common
check for local random assignment is given by investigating the density of the forcing variable around
the threshold. To this end, we conduct the two-step procedure proposed by McCrary (2008) and
the resulting density graph can be found in figure (3). The graph does not provide evidence for a
10For example, Chen & van der Klaauw (2008) clearly show that the age of an applicant is a key factor in the benefit
determination screening process in the United States.
11We talked to several heads of DI departments and they confirmed this common practice of DI being used as a
substitute for early retirement.
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discontinuity at the age of 56 as the confidence intervals clearly overlap reinforcing local random
assignment.
As an additional validity check, we compare observable characteristics to see whether they are
locally balanced around the cutoff. In fact, local random assignment implies that both observable
and unobservable factors should not systematically differ between people below and above the cutoff.
In table (4), we report differences in means for a selection of baseline covariates for individuals below
and above the age threshold. If the full sample is considered, we see that those below the cutoff differ
substantially from those above regarding their health, demographic and socio-economic background.
This should not be a surprise since those below the cutoff are much younger and thus healthier than
those above. However, as we compare people within a small range around the cutoff (± 1 year), these
differences in observables tend to vanish. Of course, the difference in the benefit award rate remains
significant which is key for our identification of the benefit effects. Other than that, individuals below
and above the cutoff are on average very similar to each other with respect to their health status,
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. It is also interesting to see that the difference in
annual benefit levels disappears which indicates that the beneficiaries below the cutoff are in fact
comparable to those above.
Overall, the inspection of the density of the forcing variable and the baseline covariates supports
the validity of the RD design and therefore reinforces our identification strategy.
5.3 The Discrete ES Model
Before going into detail about the structure of the discrete ES model, it is worth while mentioning
some estimation issues at this stage since estimation of the model parameters is not trivial. The
estimation of discrete ES models involves some complications since the likelihood function of the
model cannot be expressed in closed-form. As a consequence, the model parameters have to estimated
by maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). To simulate the labor market choice probabilities, we use
the famous Geweke, Hajivassiliou and Keane (GHK) algorithm (Geweke, 1991; Hajivassiliou and
McFadden, 1998; Keane, 1990 & 1994a) which has been proven to be the most accurate method
to simulate normal probabilities in many studies (Hajivassiliou, McFadden & Ruud, 1994). As for
the statistical properties of the MSL estimator, Gourie´roux & Monfort (1991) show that the MSL
estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator and thus consistent
under the condition that both the number of draws and the sample size approach infinity.
The discrete ES model is used to quantify the incentive effects of DI benefits on the discrete
working decision of existing beneficiaries. The theoretical model is derived using the framework of
additive random utility models (ARUM) providing a natural connection to economic choice the-
ory (Marschak, 1960). It is assumed that each decision maker i faces three working choices: yi
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 {working part-time (j = 1), full-time (j = 2) or staying out of the labor force (j = 3)}. Further-
more, agents are assumed to be rationale in the sense that they choose the alternative that is
associated with the highest utility for them. Utility is known by the decision maker but not by
the researcher. The researcher only observes some attributes of the agent and the final working de-
cision the individual makes (Train, 2009). In this model, utility for individual i from working option
j is specified as:
Uij = x
′
iβj +Diγj + εij ∀ j = 1, 2, 3; n = 1, ..., N (1)
where xi is a vector of observable characteristics including the health indicators, demographic and
socio-economic factors described in section 4; Di  {0, 1} is the binary treatment indicator for the DI
benefits; θj ≡ {βj , γj} is the vector of model parameters and εij includes all unobserved factors that
have an effect on utility but are not included in xi. A binary threshold crossing model is introduced
to address the endogeneity in the benefit status:
D∗i = w
′
iδ + vi (i = 1, ..., N) (2)
Di =
 1 if D∗i > 00 if D∗i ≤ 0
where D∗i is a continuous, latent random variable reflecting the net utility from the DI benefit receipt;
wi is the vector of exogenous variables which are the same as in xi but in addition to that, wi includes
the age cutoff as instrumental variable for the benefit status; δ is the vector of parameters and vi a
classical error term.
The vector ψi is composed of all error terms from equation (1) and (2) and is assumed to be
multivariate normal distributed with a mean vector of zero and covariance matrix Ω:
ψi =

εi1
εi2
εi3
vi
 ∼MVN (0,Ω) Ω =

σ21 σ12 σ13 σ1v
· σ22 σ23 σ2v
· · σ23 σ3v
· · · σ2v
 (3)
where e.g. σ12 is the covariance between εi1 and εi2. To ensure parameter identification of the
model, one needs to account for the fact that the level and scale of utility are irrelevant. The
absolute level of utility is irrelevant because adding any constant k to the utility of each working
option does not change the ordering of utilities and therefore has no effect on the final labor supply
choice of a beneficiary. The level of utility is normalized by choosing a base category12 and setting
the corresponding parameter vector to zero, e.g., θ1 = {β1 = 0, γ1 = 0}. Similarly, the scale of utility
is irrelevant because each utility can be multiplied by a positive constant k without changing which
12We use working part-time as the base category throughout the whole analysis.
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working alternative has the highest utility (Train, 2009). Scale of utility is normalized by imposing
constraints on Ω: as demonstrated by Bunch (1991), in case of J alternatives, one needs to impose
J constraints to account for symmetry of Ω and one more constraint to normalize scale.
5.4 Simulation of Choice Probabilities
Using the structural form of the model, probabilistic statements about the individual working deci-
sions can be made. To give an example, the probability of working full-time given DI benefits are
received is of the form:
P (yi = 2|Di = 1, xi) = P (Ui2 > Ui1, Ui2 > Ui3, D
∗
i > 0)
P (D∗i > 0)
(4)
=
∫ x′iβ2+Diγ2
−∞
∫ x′i(β2−β3)+Di(γ2−γ3)
−∞
φ2(ε˜12, ε˜32)dε˜12dε˜32
−
∫ x′iβ2−∞ ∫ x′i(β2−β3)−∞ ∫ −wiδ−∞ φ3(ε˜12, ε˜32, vi)dε˜12dε˜32dvi
Φ(−wiδ)
= Φ2(x
′
iβ2 +Diγ2, x
′
i(β2 − β3) +Di(γ2 − γ3);V1)
− Φ3(x
′
iβ2, x
′
i(β2 − β3),−wiδ;V )
Φ(−wiδ)
where φ2(·) and φ3(·) are the bi- and trivariate normal densities; Φ2(·) and Φ3(·) the corresponding
bi- and trivariate normal cdf’s with the covariance matrix of differenced errors V ; V1 ≡ ρε˜12,ε˜23 is
the correlation in differenced errors of part-time to full-time and full-time to out of the labor force.
Equation (4) demonstrates that the choice probabilities in the discrete ES model are multivariate
integrals over subsets of the Euclidean space. The problem is that these choice probabilities cannot
be expressed in closed-form. Instead, one has to use simulation methods to evaluate the integrals
numerically. In this study, the GHK-algorithm is used to simulate the working choice probabilities.
The GHK-algorithm is based on the observation that the choice probabilities as in (4) can be re-
expressed as a sequence of conditional probabilities which can be simulated recursively. The basic
principle of the algorithm is to take a predefined number of draws from the unit interval for each
observation and to generate the simulated probability at each iteration step13. In this paper, we use
the GHK-based Conditional Mixed Process Estimator14 programmed by David Roodman (2011) to
estimate the latent model parameters by maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). The corresponding
simulated log-likelihood function can be found in appendix A.2.
5.5 Treatment Effects
As in most maximum likelihood framework, we estimate latent parameters which have no useful
direct interpretation. To illustrate the DI benefit effects, we use the estimated coefficients to derive
13For an excellent treatment of the GHK-simulator see Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994) or Train (2009).
14The routine is programmed in Stata and can be installed using the command: ssc install cmp.
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the treatment effect on treated for each labor market outcome. To give an example, the treatment
effect on treated (TOT) for the outcome of working full-time is of the form15:
TOTfull = P (yi1 = 2|Di = 1, xi)− P (yi0 = 2|Di = 1, xi) (5)
= Φ2(x
′
iβ2 +Diγ2, x
′
i(β2 − β3) +Di(γ2 − γ3);V1)− Φ2(x′iβ2, x′i(β2 − β3);V1)
The TOT reflects the difference between the probability of working full-time given that beneficiary
i received DI benefits and the probability of working full-time given that the exact same beneficiary
did not receive benefits. A negative TOT therefore indicates that the DI benefit receipt decreases
the probability of working full-time and vice versa for a positive TOT.
6 Results
The results section starts with an overview of the coefficient estimates of the discrete ES model. The
estimates are shown for three different model specifications using the age cutoff as instrument for the
benefit status. We discuss the question of the incentive effects of DI benefits on the working decision
of existing beneficiaries using evidence from the distributions of the treatment effects for each labor
market outcome. For the results discussed, 1’000 random draws per observation are used to simulate
the working choice probabilities. To be more precise, antithetic Halton draws are used meaning that
each draw is mirrored through the origin to maximize uniformity of coverage of the unit interval and
therefore to achieve greater accuracy than pseudo-random draws (Train, 2009). Subsection 6.2 is
then devoted to additional robustness checks: we present the coefficient estimates as the number of
simulations is varied.
6.1 Main Results
Table (5) shows the estimated coefficients of the discrete ES model for three different model specifi-
cations. The coefficients on the benefit status are reported for the labor market outcomes of working
full-time (γˆfull) and staying out of the labor force (γˆoolf ). In all models, the discontinuity in the
benefit award rate above the age of 55 is used as the instrument for the benefit status and working
part-time is used as the baseline category. In a first step, we include demographic background char-
acteristics16 into the model resulting in a highly significant and negative coefficient on the benefit
status on the decision of working full-time. At the same time, there is no statistically significant
effect of the DI benefits on the decision of staying out of the labor force. In a second step, we add
socio-economic status indicators17 which slightly reduces (in absolute terms) the coefficient on the
15The TOT for the labor market outcomes of working part-time and out of the labor force are computed similarly.
16age, gender, weight (kg), height (cm), number of kids, foreigner, region dummies (base: Central Switzerland), type
of community dummies (base: rural)
17marital status, years of schooling, logarithmized household income, life satisfaction
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benefits for the decision of working full-time but does not affect the statistical significance. On the
other hand, the coefficient on the benefits for the outcome of not working is increased but still far
from significant. To condition on the health status of a person, we add various health indicators18 in a
final step to the labor supply equations. Although the standard error of the coefficient on the benefit
status for the decision of working full-time more than doubles, it is still statistically significant at
the 5% level. As for the coefficient on the decision of staying out of the labor force, it turns negative
and remains insignificant. Note here that the coefficient estimates in this last final specification are
basically unchanged if further control variables are added to the equation reinforcing the robustness
of the presented findings19.
The fact that the coefficient on the benefit status for the labor market outcome of working full-
time is negative and significant in all specifications suggests, at first glance, that the DI benefits
provide strong work disincentives for the existing beneficiaries. However, to appropriately address
the question on the benefit effects on the labor market decision of beneficiaries, one needs to consider
the treatment effects as outlined in the previous section. The treatment effects on treated (TOT)
provide the relevant information on the behavioral change in the labor supply decision by comparing
the working decision of a beneficiary to the working decision of the same person in the absence of the
DI benefits (the counterfactual). To provide a complete picture on the labor supply responses, figures
(4) to (6) present the whole distributions of the TOT for each labor market outcome separately. In
addition to that, table (6) gives the relevant summary statistics for each distribution. Starting with
the discussion on the benefit effects for the decision of working part-time, figure (4) shows that the
TOT for all beneficiaries in the sample is positive which means that the DI benefits in general increase
the probability of working in a part-time employment. From table (6) we see that the treatment
effects range from about 3%-points to a maximum of about 81%-points. For beneficiaries in the
upper tail of the distribution, the results suggests that the lion’s share of their working decision
is determined by the benefit status. Moreover, we see that on average the probability of working
part-time is increased by about 41%-points. In other words, the probability of working part-time for
the average beneficiary would have been about 41%-points lower in the absence of the DI benefits.
Therefore, conditional on the health status, the demographic and socio-economic background of a
beneficiary, the results provide strong evidence that the decision of working part-time is mainly
determined by the benefit status.
18number of doctor visits, number of ill-days, physical activity, health impediments, medication needed, indication
for self-assessed health and dummies for depression, back problems, weariness, headaches and sleeping problems
19Even when controlling for additional health indicators (number of hospital days, the number of specialist visits,
etc.) and parental education as a proxy for genetic endowment, the coefficient estimates are unchanged and remain
stable.
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As for the discussion of the treatment effects for the labor market outcome of working full-time,
figure (5) shows the exact opposite picture to what we just observed: here the treatment effects are
negative for all beneficiaries indicating that in general the probability of working in a full-time job
is decreased by the DI benefits. To be more specific, table (6) shows that the benefit receipt on
average decreases the probability of working full-time by about 42%-points. Hence the probability
of working full-time would have been about 42%-points higher for the average beneficiary if she/he
was not entitled to DI benefits. Furthermore, we see that the treatment effects range from about
0%-points to roughly –86%-points. In fact, for about 25% of beneficiaries the probability of working
full-time is decreased by at least 75%-points meaning that their labor supply decision is basically
entirely determined by the benefits. If we combine the results so far, then this leads to the conclusion
that the DI benefits induce the beneficiaries to reduce their working intensity from working in a
full-time job to working part-time. Following that line of thinking, the financial incentives provided
by the Swiss DI system create substantial lock-in effects which at least in part might explain the low
DI outflow of existing beneficiaries as observed in most developed economies (OECD, 2010).
What remains is the discussion of the benefit effects for the labor market outcome of staying out
of the labor force. Figure (6) shows that the treatment effects take on both positive and negative
values with a large probability mass at zero. In addition, we see from table (6) that the probability of
staying out of the labor force is only weakly increased by about 3%-points for the average beneficiary.
This allows for the conclusion that the decision of not participating in the labor market is hardly
influenced by the benefit status. To put it differently, the decision of staying out of the labor force
can be explained by many background characteristics of a beneficiary, the benefit status on the other
hand is not a very valuable predictor.
Summing up, the analysis of this more complex labor market decision reveals aspects which have
not been captured by the existing literature which has entirely focused on simple binary working
decisions (e.g. Parsons (1980), Bound (1989), Gruber (2000), Chen and van der Klaauw (2008),
French & Song (2014)). Our results suggest that the working decision of existing beneficiaries is to
a large part determined by their benefit status. Moreover, the findings provide evidence that DI
benefits create strong lock-in effects as the beneficiaries are induced to shift their working intensity
from working full-time to part-time.
6.2 Robustness Checks
In this robustness section, we present the estimated model coefficients as the number of pseudo-
random draws (S) increases. Table (7) shows the discrete ES estimates for 1, 10, 100 and 1000 draws
per observation, the number of iterations needed to reach convergence, the value of the pseudo log-
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likelihood at the coefficient vector and the computation time in seconds20. Recall that for the main
results discussed above, 1000 draws per observation were used to estimate the model coefficients so
that column 4 in table (7) is identical to the results presented in table (5). For small numbers of
draws, we know from asymptotic theory that the MSL estimator is not equivalent to the ML estimator
and is inconsistent (Gourie´roux & Monfort, 1991). This is likely to be the case for the estimates
corresponding to S = 1 and S = 10 draws per observation. For such small S, the significantly reduced
computation time comes at the cost of inconsistent estimates. However, as the number of draws is
increased to S = 100, the MSL estimates stabilize and remain basically unchanged with the only
exception of model specification (1) for the outcome of staying out of the labor force. Other than
that, table (7) suggests that estimates with as few as 100 random draws per observation produce
reliable coefficient estimates that are very close to those when using S = 1000. This is also relevant
to know from a practical point of view since the differences in computation time are considerable:
for the full specification used to produce the results discussed in the last section, the computation
time is roughly 2 minutes for S = 100 but already 17 minutes for S = 1000. If the number of draws
is further increased above S = 100021, the coefficient estimates hardly change but again come at the
cost of a much higher computational time.
7 Conclusion
Over the course of the past few decades, the number of beneficiaries and the costs of DI programs
have literally exploded in most OECD countries. At the same time only a tiny fraction of those who
are entitled to DI benefits ever leave the DI system and very little is known about the mechanisms
related to the DI outflow. Policy makers who want to effectively improve the incentive structure of
the DI system therefore need to ask the question of how the working decision of existing beneficiaries
is affected by the DI benefits. This paper investigates exactly that question by analyzing the potential
lock-in effects that are created by the financial incentives embodied in the Swiss DI system. We use a
fuzzy RD design exploiting a discontinuity in the DI benefit award rate to instrument the individual
benefit status. Specifically, we estimate discrete endogenous switching (ES) models (Miranda &
Rabe-Hesketh, 2006; Roodman, 2011) to identify the benefit effects on the labor market decision of
existing beneficiaries. Unlike the existing literature (e.g. Gruber (2000), Chen & van der Klaauw
(2008), Marie & Castello (2012), French & Song (2014), Moore (2015)), we analyze the discrete
working decision of working part-time, full-time or staying out of the labor force instead of focusing
only on the binary choice of working versus not working. Our results reveal interesting new aspects
of the labor supply decision of existing beneficiaries and show that their individual working decision
20The simulations were ran on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4500 CPU @ 2.39 GHz with 8GB RAM on Windows 8.1 pro.
21The specifications were also estimated for S = 2000 and S = 5000 and the results are available upon request.
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is considerably influenced by the DI benefits. The DI benefits, conditional on the demographic and
socio-economic background and the health status, increase the probability of working in a part-time
employment by about 41%-points, decrease the probability of working full-time by about 42%-points
and have little or no effect on the decision of staying out of the labor force for the average beneficiary.
It follows that the DI benefits induce a change in the labor supply of beneficiaries from working full-
time to working part-time instead of forcing them completely out of the labor market. A positive
interpretation of these findings would be that the DI system works in the sense that people who
receive the benefits remain in the working process. A more critical interpretation on the other hand
would be that the financial incentives provided by the DI system triggers beneficiaries to lower their
working intensity and therefore keeps them dependent on the income transfers, which in turn adds
a possible explanation for the low DI outflow as observed in many OECD countries. Overall, the
results have proven to be robust against the inclusion of further control variables and variations
in the number of simulation draws when estimating the model coefficients by maximum simulated
likelihood.
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Appendix A.1
Variable Construction
The indicator for DI benefits is constructed from the annual amount of DI pensions a person receives
and equals one for individuals in the sample who receive DI benefits and zero for those who do not
receive any income transfers from the Swiss DI. The discrete labor force participation variable is one
for individuals who work part-time, two for those who work full-time and three for those who are
unemployed or not in the labor force. The dummy variable ”happy” is created from a life satisfaction
variable that is scaled from ”not satisfied” (0) to ”completely satisfied” (10) and is coded such that
it is one for individuals with a satisfaction score of at least seven and zero else. General health status
ranges from ”very well” (1) to ”not well at all” (5) and is recoded as a dummy variable good health
that takes the value one for individuals with a ”very well” or ”well” health status and zero, else.
Physical activity is a binary variable indicating whether a person exercises for at least half an hour a
week (one) or if that person remains inactive (zero). Health impediments in everyday activities and
medication needed in everyday functioning are measured on a 11-point scale from ”not at all” (0)
to ”a great deal” (10). For both of these variables I generate an indicator that is one for individuals
with a value of at least 5 in terms of severity of the health impediments and medication needed for
everyday functioning and zero, for all others. Depression, anxiety and blues is measured on a scale
of ”never” (0) to ”always” (10). I construct from that information the indicator depression which
equals to zero for all observations below 3 and one for the rest. The cutoff value of 3 is chosen
here as the 75%-quantile in the distribution of the original depression variable. Finally, indicators
for back problems, weakness and weariness, sleeping problems and headaches are dummy variables
which were created in the way that they are one for observations that report that they are suffering
”very much” and zero for those who are suffering ”not at all” or ”somewhat” from these illnesses.
Appendix A.2
Simulated Log-Likelihood
The vector of model parameters θj ≡ {βj , γj} and Ω are estimated by maximizing a simulated
log-likelihood function of the form,
SLL(θ,Ω;x, y) =
3∑
j=1
N∑
n=1
dijDilog(P˜ (yi = j|Di = 1))
+
3∑
j=1
N∑
n=1
dij(1−Di)log(P˜ (yi = j|Di = 0)) (6)
where dij is an indicator for the choice taken by individual i, Di is the indicator for the DI benefits
and P˜ (·) is the simulated (conditional) choice probability.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Degree of Disability and Pensions
Degree of disability Type of pension Minimum Maximum
Less than 40% No pension - -
40-49% quarter pension 277 CHF 553 CHF
50-59% half pension 553 CHF 1105 CHF
60-69% three quarter pension 829 CHF 1658 CHF
More than 70% full pension 1105 CHF 2210 CHF
Note: Source: Federal Social Insurance Office (2014). The minimum and maximum pensions
are monthly benefits adjusted for inflation in Swiss Francs of 2007.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics:
Beneficiaries versus Non-Beneficiaries
Difference in means t-tests
Full sample
Beneficiaries Non-Beneficiaries Difference
Age 49.64 43.35 6.29***
Female 0.54 0.55 -0.01
Weight (kg) 76.07 71.70 4.37***
Height (cm) 169.84 171.33 -1.49**
Number of kids 0.41 0.63 -0.22***
Foreigner 0.12 0.10 0.02
Married 0.47 0.56 -0.08**
Education 11.99 13.44 -1.45***
Household Income (CHF) 104’538 149’016 -44’479***
Happy 0.64 0.90 -0.26***
Number of doctor visits 14.73 4.79 9.94***
Number of ill-days 86.82 8.43 78.39***
Physical activity 0.54 0.80 -0.26***
Impediments 0.73 0.16 0.56***
Medication needed 0.66 0.16 0.51***
Good health 0.48 0.86 -0.38***
Depressed 0.49 0.20 0.29***
Back problems 0.29 0.09 0.20***
Weariness 0.29 0.09 0.21***
Insomnia 0.22 0.08 0.14***
Headache 0.11 0.07 0.04**
Notes: The first and second columns show the average value for a selection of demographic,
socio-economic and health related indicators. Column three displays the t-test for the null
of no difference in means: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: First-Stage Regression Results
First Stage Effects
Dependent Variable: DI Benefits
I(age > 55) 0.044*** 0.042**
(0.016) (0.019)
Control Variables No Yes
Number of Observations 3’873 3’873
R2 0.05 0.166
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stats 10.60 6.87
Notes: First-stage regression results using the indicator for DI benefits as
dependent variable. The set of exogenous controls variables includes all the
demographic, socio-economic and health related variables as described in the
data section 4. The instrumental variable is the indicator for the discontinuity
in the benefit award rate above the age of 55. Age is centered at 56. Standard
errors clustered at the household level: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Validity checks:
Differences in Baseline Covariates
Difference in Means t-tests
Full sample Window: ± 1 years
Below Above Difference Below Above Difference
Benefit Receipt 0.03 0.07 -0.04*** 0.04 0.09 -0.04**
Annual Benefits (CHF) 20’857.00 22’507.80 -1650.80** 24’320 20’012.50 4307.50
Number of Doctor Visits 5.07 5.74 -0.67* 5.12 6.25 -1.13
Number of Ill-Days 9.72 15.55 -5.83*** 12.28 13.79 -1.51
Physical Activity 0.80 0.77 0.03** 0.78 0.77 0.01
Depression 0.20 0.24 -0.04*** 0.27 0.29 -0.01
Back Problems 0.09 0.13 -0.04*** 0.12 0.16 -0.04
Weariness 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.12 -0.03
Insomnia 0.08 0.11 -0.03*** 0.12 0.15 -0.03
Headaches 0.08 0.06 0.02* 0.06 0.10 -0.03
Female 0.52 0.52 0.01 0.49 0.51 -0.02
Weight (kg) 71.60 72.81 -1.21*** 74.12 73.21 0.91
Height (cm) 171.84 169.56 2.28*** 171.43 169.70 1.73*
Number of Kids 0.76 0.07 0.69*** 0.22 0.16 0.06
Share of Foreigners 0.12 0.10 0.03*** 0.15 0.12 0.03
Married 0.50 0.74 -0.24*** 0.75 0.73 0.01
Years of Schooling 13.19 13.05 0.14 13.27 13.12 0.14
Life Satisfaction 0.89 0.88 0.01 0.88 0.86 0.03
Notes: t-tests for the null of no difference in means below and above the age cutoff at 56 for a selection of baseline
covariates: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1..
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Table 5: Discrete Endogenous Switching Model Coefficient Estimates
DI Benefit Effects
Dependent Variable: Working Status (1) (2) (3)
γˆfull -3.08*** -2.96*** -2.61**
(0.42) (0.54) (1.30)
γˆoolf 0.17 0.67 -0.23
(0.95) (1.03) (1.63)
Background 1: Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Background 2: Socio-Economic Status No Yes Yes
Background 3: Health No No Yes
Number of Observations 3’531 3’531 3’531
Number of Iterations 9 7 8
Pseudo Log-likelihood -2’515.17 -2’363.16 -1’781.40
Computation time (sec) 1’266.41 1’003.55 1’021.41
Notes: Discrete ES coefficient estimates on the DI benefit status for the labor market out-
comes working full-time and out of the labor force (base category: working part-time) based
on 1’000 GHK draws. Coefficients on all background variables are not shown. Standard
errors clustered at the household level: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
Background 1: Age, gender, weight (kg), height (cm), number of kids, foreigner, region dum-
mies (base: Central Switzerland), type of community dummies (base: rural);
Background 2: Marital status, years of schooling, logarithmized household income, life sat-
isfaction
Background 3: Number of doctor visits, number of ill-days, physical activity, health imped-
iments, medication needed, indication for self-assessed health and dummies for depression,
back problems, weariness, headaches and sleeping problems.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics:
Average Treatment Effects on Treated (ATT)
Labor Market Outcome Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Working part-time 0.412 0.260 0.031 0.807
Working full-time -0.416 0.315 -0.862 -0.000
Out of the labor force 0.032 0.068 -0.056 0.444
Notes: Summary statistics of the treatment effects on treated for the labor market out-
comes working part-time, full-time and out of the labor force. The TOTs’ are based on the
coefficient estimates from the discrete ES model as outlined in specification (3) in table (4).
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Table 7: Robustness Checks:
Varying the Number of Simulation Draws
Number of Draws S = 1 S = 10 S = 100 S = 1000
γˆfull -2.87*** -2.68*** -1.78** -2.99*** -2.84*** -2.64*** -3.06*** -2.92*** -2.60** -3.08*** -2.96*** -2.61**
(0.33) (0.39) (0.79) (0.33) (0.38) (0.72) (0.46) (0.49) (1.28) (0.42) (0.54) (1.30)
γˆoolf 1.00 0.63 -0.31 0.82 0.70 0.37 0.60 0.70 -0.24 0.17 0.67 -0.23
(0.30) (0.42) (1.58) (0.82) (0.79) (1.60) (1.49) (0.79) (1.63) (0.95) (1.03) (1.63)
Background 1: Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background 2: Socio-Economic Status No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Background 3: Health No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Number of Iterations 5 6 5 6 7 8 8 7 8 9 7 8
Pseudo Log-likelihood -2’519.01 -2’365.04 -1’781.10 -2’515.00 -2’362.32 -1’780.70 -2’515.67 -2’363.34 -1’781.43 -2515.17 -2363.16 -1781.40
Computation time (sec) 4.90 5.75 4.78 9.36 10.66 11.31 304’58 126.85 141.06 1’266.41 1’003.55 1’021.41
Notes: Discrete ES coefficient estimates using different numbers of simulation draws (S). The simulations were ran on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4500 CPU @ 2.39 GHz with 8GB RAM on Windows 8.1 pro.
See notes from table (4) for a description of the background characteristics used in each specification. Standard errors clustered at the household level: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Figure 1: Share of DI Beneficiaries
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Notes: The panels show the share of beneficiaries from 2002-2012. The top left panel shows the overall
share of beneficiaries which is at a level of about 3.5% within this timeframe. The top right panel shows
the share of beneficiaries for the middle-aged (ages 20-54) subpopulation (average: 2.5%). The bottom left
panel finally shows the percentage of DI beneficiaries between the ages of 55-65 with an average share of
about 7.1%.
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Figure 2: Discontinuity in the Benefit Award Rate
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Notes: Figure 2 displays the discontinuity in the benefit award rate overlaid with the fitted line from a
local polynomial regression along with the corresponding 95% confidence band (bins of half-years of age).
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Figure 3: Density of the Forcing Variable:
McCrary Test
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Notes: Figure 3 shows the density estimate based on the two-step procedure proposed by McCrary(2008).
The graph shows no evidence for a discontinuity at the age cutoff reinforcing local random assignment.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the Treatment Effects on Treated (TOT)
Average TOT: 41%-points
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Notes: Figure 4 shows the distribution of the treatment effect on treated (TOT) for the labor market
outcome of working part-time overlaid with a kernel density estimate. A positive (negative) sign on the
TOT indicates an increase (decrease) in the probability of working part-time.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the Treatment Effects on Treated (TOT)
Average TOT: -42%-points
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Notes: Figure 5 displays the distribution of the treatment effect on treated (TOT) for the labor market
outcome of working full-time overlaid with a kernel density estimate. A positive (negative) sign on the
TOT indicates an increase (decrease) in the probability of working full-time.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Treatment Effects on Treated (TOT)
Average TOT: 3%-points
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Notes: Figure 6 displays the histogram of the treatment effect on treated (TOT) for the labor market
outcome of staying out of the labor force overlaid with a kernel density estimate. A positive (negative)
sign on the TOT indicates an increase (decrease) in the probability to stay away from the labor market.
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